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Introduction
Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, Piotr Franaszek, Dieter Stiefel and Alice Teichova
This volume explores economic relations between socialist planned economies of Cen-
tral and East European countries and capitalist market economies of neutral states in 
Europe during the Cold War. It focuses on the signifi cant role of neutral countries as 
path-breakers in building East–West contacts.
Economic historians have mainly studied relations between the leading Western states 
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, but have so far paid scarce attention to the 
signifi cance of neutrality in the European context during the second half of the twentieth 
century. For instance, although affected by the ‘Iron Curtain’, economic relations contin-
ued between socialist countries and neutral Austria, the only state in East Central Europe 
with a functioning market economy during the Cold War. This is of special signifi cance 
for Austria since three of the socialist planned economies had been successor states of 
the same Habsburg Monarchy from which the Republic of Austria had also emerged. 
Thus Austrian neutrality, nourished by geographical closeness and the long common 
history of Central and South-East European countries, was of considerable importance 
in making the ‘Iron Curtain’ more permeable than is generally assumed. In a similar way 
neutral Finland’s proximity to the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe engendered trade and fi nancial relations between its market economy and the 
planned economic systems in spite of restrictions imposed by the Cold War. For com-
parison, we have also included in our studies the economic relations of neutral Sweden, 
Switzerland and Ireland with socialist planned economies under Cold War conditions, 
thus encompassing all European countries with neutrality status.
These considerations led the editors to ascertain the accessibility of archive material 
and other sources with a view to making a contribution to fi lling this gap in our knowl-
edge. Discussions were encouraged among colleagues which gave the impulse to the 
fi rst international conference in Vienna on ‘Delicate Relationships: Austria and Europe’s 
Planned Economies’ in June 2004.1 Further research led to Session 101 on ‘Cold War 
and Neutrality’ at the International Economic History Congress in Helsinki 2006. This 
volume contains the revised versions of the papers presented at this Session.
The starting point of our quest was Austria because of its specifi c role at the interface 
of East and West. This distinctive place emanates not only from the country’s historical 
bonds and its geographical position, but also from its post-war polity. Oliver Rathkolb’s 
overview demonstrates that Austria became part of the East–West confl ict after the end 
of the Second World War. As a result of four-power occupation (by Britain, France, the 
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USA and the Soviet Union) Austria experienced concurrently a market system in the west 
and a Soviet system in the east of its territory before gaining independence and neutrality 
status in 1955. Moreover, the existence of state ownership of big industrial enterprises and 
banks in Austria based on the post-war takeover of German property enhanced the possibi-
-lity of business ties with the neighbouring states’ centralized socialist planned economies. 
Andreas Resch’s statistical survey shows that 30 per cent of the exports of the nationalized 
sector of Austrian industry went to states which were members of the CMEA (Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance, otherwise known as COMECON). Although after 1945 
the direction of Austrian foreign trade turned westwards and trade with Eastern European 
neighbours did not rise to its pre-war level, Austria’s trade volume with Central and South-
-East Europe was the highest among all the neutral European states.
A further specifi c feature of the Austrian case is – as far as we could establish – unique. 
In the course of the historical scenario from Allied occupation to neutrality, unconven-
tional methods of trade, business and entrepreneurship developed of which very little is 
generally known. Thus favourable conditions for East–West trade links, on the one hand, 
and the enhanced post-war role of the Communist Party of Austria (CPA), on the other, 
facilitated the rise of ‘cloaked companies’ – Austrian enterprises run by members of the 
Communist Party. While this led to remarkable earnings from profi table East–West trade 
for the CPA Party, it was accompanied by the decline of the Party to insignifi cance in 
Austrian politics. These fi ndings presented by Gertrude Enderle-Burcel show that, in 
order to circumvent the barriers of the Cold War, trade found a West–East route from 
Austria with the assistance of these cloaked companies. Nevertheless, the bulk of rela-
tions with the country’s Eastern neighbours went through offi cial fi nancial, trading and 
business channels, because representatives of Austrian trading enterprises, banks and 
state-owned industries were in general interested in developing business links with these 
neighbours. In the end, by throwing open its borders to Hungary, Austria was the media-
tor in the fi nal rupture of the Iron Curtain. Against this historical background Austria’s 
fast economic expansion after 1989 into the economies of its Eastern neighbours is of 
interest, especially with regard to the growing infl uence of Austrian banks in this area. 
Doubtlessly, this is to a large extent derived from the infl uential role and political past of 
Austria in Eastern Europe.
Examining the characteristic features of relations of the other neutral European mar-
ket economies with the Eastern European socialist states the authors could not fi nd simi-
lar forms of trade relationships to the Austrian case, that is, involving the communist 
parties. Although, throughout the Cold War, all the European neutral countries were eco-
nomically, politically and ideologically heavily dependent on the capitalist West, they 
manoeuvred between US demands for boycott and their own economic interests in trad-
ing with the socialist East. Andrea Komlosy analyses these complex relationships by 
assessing the impact of international organizations on East–West relations. Restrictions 
imposed by US pressure eased somewhat after the oil crisis of the 1970s, when the 
West searched for new markets. Also the socialist European countries that had joined 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) pursued a policy of acceleration 
of modernization of production by using trade contacts with the West. Yet, the USA 
insisted on reimposing prohibitions by the 1980s, trying to enforce the rules of COCOM 
(Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control).
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The exception was the case of Yugoslavia, shown by Žarko Lazarević as being be-
tween East and West – a neutral country with a socialist system, boycotted by the Soviet 
bloc after its political break with the Soviet Union in 1948. As a consequence Yugosla-
via became the recipient of Western aid, especially from the United States. From the late 
1950s trade with CMEA countries gained in importance for Yugoslavia. Thus a double 
trade system was established: the balance of Yugoslavia’s trade with the East European 
communist countries was positive, but trade with Western countries remained habitually 
negative. However, as trade with communist countries was conducted on a clearing ba-
sis, the surplus did not improve the overall Yugoslav balance of payments.
In one respect Yugoslavia shared the economic decline of the other communist East 
European economies because of excessive indebtedness to Western countries during the 
1980s.
In a certain sense also Finland had an exceptional relationship with both the East 
and the West. Finland’s close economic ties with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold 
War led to economic growth and profi table development of the Finnish economy. Here 
Pekka Sutela’s discovery of documents in archives provides a glimpse into Finnish–So-
viet trade negotiations, which allows the author to assess the professionalism and po-
litical character of Soviet delegates. He concludes that the Soviet market contributed to 
Finland’s technological development and economic growth. Also in trade relations with 
the East European socialist countries Finland held second place among the European 
neutral states. Overall in comparison with other European neutral countries, Finland sub-
stantially expanded CMEA trade. Czechoslovakia played a key role in this development 
by means of trilateral agreements between Finland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR. In 
this respect Finland is a special case, as in contra-distinction to the other neutral market 
economies no strong pressure from the USA seems to have been exerted on the Finnish 
government to reduce or cease trading with the Soviet Union and the European socialist 
countries.
Neutrality had survived in Switzerland during the Second World War and it also was 
maintained during the Cold War. Eastern trade gained in importance for the Swiss eco-
nomy during the fi rst few years after 1945. East Central and South-East European coun-
tries, especially Czechoslovakia, became valuable substitutes for former export and im-
port partners, especially Germany – as confi rmed by Eduard Kubů and Bohumír Brom. 
Christina Lohm and Bruno Fritzsche establish that, owing to the intensifi ed integration 
of Eastern European countries into CMEA and the growing pressure from the USA on 
Switzerland, the trade volume with the socialist countries decreased, while the political 
signifi cance of trade with Eastern Europe rose. This became particularly evident with re-
gard to the interest of the Swiss machine industry in trading with Eastern Europe. It was 
not only of interest to Switzerland from an economic point of view, but it also served as 
a demonstration of Swiss neutrality.
In general, Switzerland was fi rmly integrated into the Western bloc: 94 per cent of its 
trade was transacted with capitalist Western countries. Public opinion and to a large ex-
tent the political attitude of offi cial Switzerland were in fact not neutral, but quite openly 
anti-communist. Yet, in the case of Eastern Europe, the neutrality policy of Switzerland 
supported its commercial interests. Also, trade relations with socialist countries helped 
to lend credit to that policy.
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Quite different was the position of Ireland as a neutral state, as Geiger relates. On bal-
ance Ireland largely complied with the American strategic embargo policy, as by adopt-
ing this policy Irish foreign trade, which was minimal with the socialist countries, did not 
suffer any severe losses. On the contrary, the Irish government could be seen as having 
sound anti-communist credentials which quietened the strong Catholic voices advocat-
ing a total cessation of trade with Eastern European countries in 1954. Such intervention 
by the Catholic hierarchy and organizations strengthened the Irish government’s resolve 
to keep trade with socialist countries to a minimum. As a consequence, Irish govern-
ments continued to reject the periodic approaches by Eastern European governments to 
conclude bilateral trade agreements.
Assessing the case of Sweden Gerard Aalders questions the legal value of the concept 
of ‘neutrality’ during an ‘undeclared war’. He asks: how neutral has Sweden been since 
the end of the Second World War? It is obvious that Sweden could not go too far in impos-
ing export restrictions. If it had done so, it might have jeopardized essential imports from 
the Eastern bloc. For example, coal from Poland was vital for Swedish industry, after im-
ports from Great Britain had stopped. In Washington, Swedish co-operation with American 
demands for trade restrictions was considered to be insuffi cient and the US government 
sought to improve it through pressure on private Swedish companies and individuals. Sum-
marizing the Swedish attitude towards this US pressure, the following can be stated: while 
Sweden refused to be offi cially associated with the US embargo policy against socialist 
countries, the administration went along as far as possible within the frame of its policy of 
neutrality. For instance, selling war materials to the communist bloc would be considered 
as undermining its own national security. Stockholm tried also to be on its guard against the 
Soviet Union which, through Polish coal, could exert pressure on the country. In defence 
of its relations with socialist planned economies, Sweden constantly tried to uphold the 
illusion that economics and politics could be kept separate in foreign trade. Generally, as 
Aalders concludes, Stockholm has defi ned its foreign policy as ‘neutral’.
In their approach from the view of the socialist planned economies of Eastern Europe, 
authors turn in their contributions to the nature of the economic relationships between 
the individual socialist countries and the capitalist market economies of neutral states in 
Europe. These have generally, and mostly mistakenly, been seen as a single monolithic 
bloc. However, historic reality shows a rather diversifi ed picture. From an East European 
perspective the neutral states were regarded as mediators between East and West, yet the 
policies of each socialist state differed.
Thus Poland, as evidence put forward by Piotr Franaszek confi rms, was mainly inter-
ested in Sweden and Finland, its neighbours in the Baltic Sea area. Of great importance 
also was trade with Austria which was furthered not only because of historic ties but 
mainly because of the existence of a strong state sector in Austrian industry. Poland’s 
advantage was the nature and the lower prices of its exports, such as coal, raw materials 
and agricultural products. In trade relations of neutral European countries with Poland, 
but also with Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, the iron and steel 
industry played a major role, as Dagmara Jajeśniak’s research results show. Poland’s 
trade relations declined and ultimately broke down mainly as a result of its economic 
and political crisis in the 1980s and its enormous indebtedness, rather than because of 
Cold War obstacles.
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Eduard Kubů and Bohumír Brom, examining the case of Czechoslovakia, show that 
this state’s contacts with Switzerland and Sweden were successfully re-established after 
economic ties had broken down during the Second World War. Thus, for instance, im-
ports from Switzerland to the Czechoslovak Republic rose ten-fold between 1945 and 
1948. In relations with Austria, however, diffi culties of a political and bureaucratic na-
ture prevented the full restoration of traditional economic ties. Altogether the mounting 
tensions of the Cold War put an end to this development in the 1950s.
There existed also other problems which stymied East–West economic relations, such 
as the integration of Czechoslovakia into CMEA and its role as producer of war materials 
and engineering equipment for the Soviet bloc – it had to change its fi ve-year plans fun-
damentally to meet these demands. This led to failures in fulfi lling deliveries according 
to bilateral trade agreements with Western partners. In addition, there were complaints 
from Switzerland and Sweden, discussed by Dagmara Jajeśniak, about inferior quality, 
excessive prices and belated deliveries from Czechoslovakia. Sources cited by Valen-
tina Fava contain frequent complaints, mostly from Austria, Finland and Sweden, ad-
dressed to the Czechoslovak automobile industry, concerning defects of Škoda cars. In 
general, these production problems remained unresolved as Czechoslovakia’s industry 
and international trade were falling behind as a result of thwarted economic reforms after 
1968. On the other hand, L’udovít Hallon and Miroslav Londák’s research on Slovakia’s 
economy after that state gained greater independence as part of the establishment of the 
Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia in 1969, provides proof of rising developments in 
co-operation with neutral European states, not only in trade but also on the level of en-
terprises, especially from the early 1970s onwards.
Greater insight into relations between Czechoslovakia and Sweden is provided by 
the case of iron ore: since the Austro-Hungarian monarchy Czech industry had relied on 
high-quality Swedish iron ore and had built up its production lines accordingly. Swe-
den, therefore, was in a strong position and Czechoslovak offi cials complained that the 
Swedes ‘take advantage of it by systematically stepping up their demands year by year’. 
But Czechoslovakia had to comply, in order to secure vital imports. As a result of this 
weak position, Czechoslovakia paid more indemnifi cation for nationalized property to 
Sweden and to Switzerland than to any other country – a clear indication of the impor-
tance of the neutrals in commercial relations with the capitalist world.
Explaining the position of East Germany (the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany) 
as a socialist planned economy, Christoph Boyer points out its distinct situation with 
regards to West Germany. He argues that this case has to be examined under special 
international relations which he reviews in his chapter. Many of the neutral European 
states offi cially recognized the existence of an East German state, that is the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), only in the 1970s. From this point in time trade with West 
European neutral states increased, particularly in heavy industry, such as iron and steel. 
The GDR was eager to import advanced technology, in the form of either investment 
goods, joint ventures or scientifi c collaboration. This collaboration reached its highest 
point at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Similar aims were pursued also by the other socialist countries from the 1970s on-
wards. Their goal was to gain independence from the West by modernizing their econo-
mies and to achieve autarky within the CMEA system. This resulted in growing in-
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debtedness and, eventually, in fi nancial crises. Ágnes Pogány covers the most important 
stages of this process by examining Hungary’s political and economic relations with 
Austria. Also trade balances of the other East European countries with the Western world 
were, with only a few exceptions, invariably negative. Only Czechoslovakia was more 
careful in its trading relations and did not have a serious debt problem when the socialist 
system collapsed.
Last but not least, there were ‘systemic confl icts’ between centrally planned and mar-
ket economies which led to irritations on both sides. 
These circumstances enhanced the economic crisis of the socialist planned econo-
mies at the end of the 1980s. Concurrently, the political upheaval in the Soviet Union 
during perestroika led to weakening of the links between the Soviet Union and the East 
European socialist states, above all, with Poland and Hungary, and fi nally led to the col-
lapse of the GDR and the whole socialist system in Europe.
Certain tentative conclusions can be drawn from the research results presented in this 
volume about the interplay of international politics and economics during the Cold War, 
which enable us to identify different periods in terms of the methods of trading and busi-
ness between neutral capitalist market economies and socialist planned economies.
The fi rst stage is from the end of the 1940s to the beginning of the 1970s. With the 
enforcement of the Marshall Plan in the West and the rapid rearmament drive imposed by 
the fi ve-year plans in the socialist states, East–West trade relations sank to their lowest 
level. They were conducted mainly on the basis of bilateral trade and clearing proce-
dures. During the political détente in the 1960s, the volume of trade rose. An important 
aspect towards the end of this stage was the increase in corporate co-operation. Here, for 
instance, Austria played a leading role – its most important partners were Hungary and 
Romania.
The second stage is from the beginning of the 1970s to the early 1980s. Growth in the 
world economy was slowing down with the end of post-war reconstruction. For Western 
countries trade with Eastern Europe became more desirable, particularly for the neutral 
countries’ market economies. These variations can be followed in the statistical tables on 
trade in the chapters of this volume. Neutral market economies, especially Finland and 
Austria, conducted the greatest amount of trade with the planned economies of Eastern 
Europe. Also the oil crisis at the beginning of the 1970s weakened the Marshall Plan 
policy. At the same time industrial mass production shifted to knowledge-based indus-
tries controlled largely by multinational companies. East–West bilateral trade relations 
began to be replaced by loan fi nancing from the West, by multilateral solutions and by 
the transition to currency convertibility, facilitated by the entry of the East European 
socialist states into GATT. Most Eastern European states began to accept foreign invest-
ments in the form of joint ventures from which they hoped to gain advanced technology 
and know-how in their drive for modernization. For their Western partners made-to-or-
der production in socialist countries’ factories was interesting owing to the prevailing 
low level of wages in the East.
The third and last stage falls in the 1980s – until 1989. The permeability of the Iron 
Curtain had increased substantially which led to a forceful insistence by the USA that 
Western states, including the neutral states, should abide by the restrictions agreed in 
COCOM. As a result greater controls were imposed on goods and capital movement 
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from West to East. On the one hand, the embargo provisions prevented high-tech prod-
ucts, which the Eastern European states had expected to receive as part of their modern-
ization policies, from reaching the East, and on the other hand, trade restrictions confi ned 
Eastern European exports to the West largely to foodstuffs, semi-fi nished and cheap-
wage products. In turn this led to soaring indebtedness to Western neutral countries in 
the East. Thus, Western loans, particularly when interest rates rose steeply in the 1980s, 
obstructed the East’s policy to catch up with the West. Concurrently, the intermediate 
role of neutral Western states had shifted to international organizations in politics (UN, 
CSCE/OSCE) and in economics (IMF, GATT/WTO). These developments contributed 
to the systemic change which ended in the demise of both the political and the economic 
systems of the socialist countries.
From the study of economic relationships between market economies of neutral states 
and planned economies of socialist states in post-1945 Europe, it can be concluded that 
neutral European countries assisted in opening the way to economic and technological 
contacts with the planned economies of Eastern Europe and thus contributed to making 
the Iron Curtain more permeable. This aspect of twentieth-century economic history has 
been unjustly neglected and it is hoped that it will be more extensively empirically ex-
amined against the background of political and social change. If such research is encour-
aged by this volume the hopes of the editors and contributors will be fulfi lled.
Notes
1 See Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, Dieter Stiefel and Alice Teichova (eds.), ‘Zarte Bande’ Österreich und die 
europäischen planwirtschaftlichen Länder [‘Delicate Relationships’: Austria and Europe’s Planned Econo-
mies], Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchiv, Sonderband 9 (2006).
